On a slow, rainy Friday in Washington, when all eyes are on presidential politics, this little gem arrived over the ticker courtesy of Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Speaking at the Brookings Institution Monday, Gates said:
Want to see a great example of the arrogance of power? Digging through the Pentagon document dump covering its manipulation of the media, Cernig unearths the following truffle:
While you were sleeping, Hezbollah basically took over Beirut. My friend Chris Allbritton, until very recently a reporter based in the city, blogs from Dubai:
For one Berkeley professor, a recently released torture memo authored by Yoo raises questions about the meaning of academic freedom.
Donald Vandergriff is a member emeritus of the counterinsurgency/4th-generation-warfare community. And he has some insightful criticism of my Petraeus interview. Take it away, Don:
I asked Gen. Petraeus what Iraq taught him about COIN, and what that in turn taught him about American power. What’d he say?
Here, Gen. Petraeus muses on what he’d tell a subordinate who’d reprise Petraeus’s famous 2003 line: "Tell me how this ends."
So you read my piece about my interview with Petraeus, and you thought, "Ackerman? I don't trust him. How do I know he's not quoting Petraeus out of context?" And you know what? Fair point. So here we're going to present you with portions of the interview on interesting subjects, and my understanding is that a full transcript is forthcoming.
Here's Gen. Petraeus on the uncomfortable relationship between counterinsurgency and occupation.
Remember the New York Times story about Pentagon ties to retired military officers who spouted the DOD line in the press? Well DOD just did a huge document dump on the program. Help me dig through this crap! Highlight good stuff in comments.
Good piece from Tina Susman in the Los Angeles Times about the military's skittish and ambivalent attitude toward the Mahdi Army. In my interview with Petraeus yesterday, the general denied credit to the Sadrists for their social-service achievements, saying that Sadr hijacked government hospitals and such, while drawing the distinction between the Sadrist Current (good) and the Mahdi Army (bad). It's a distinction I'm ambivalent about: on the one hand, it's a sensible counterinsurgency/diplomatic move; on the other, I doubt it describes the Sadrist Current as it actually exists.
According to Susman's piece, company and platoon commanders in Baghdad see it the latter way:
Gen. David H. Petraeus used the principles of counterinsurgency to lead the surge of U.S. forces in Iraq. In an interview today he talks about the hard road ahead.
The intricate legal battle over missing White House emails could be going somewhere. Theresa Payne, the White House's chief information officer,has admitted that there are no backup tapes of Executive Office of the President emails between March 1, 2003 and May 22, 2003. This timeframe roughly coincides with the invasion of Iraq (which was March 19, 2003) and "Mission Accomplished" victory declaration (May 1, 2003).
A court order in a civil suit- filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington and the National Security Archive- instructed Payne and the president's office to release all email backup tapes from March 2003 to October 2003.
Some Army officials would rather develop tools for unknown threats.
According to the Washington Post's Walter Pincus, we're beefing up our presence at an Iraqi air base that's only 35 miles from the Iranian border.
Counterinsurgent extraordinaire John Nagl has long been promoting the idea that the U.S. Army needs a corps of advisers to train foreign militaries. The most compelling point of the idea could be summed up as follows: the more we get them to do, the less we have to do. It's a disputable point, but certainly one worth debating. However, Nagl's proposal seems to have gotten more traction in Tehran than in Washington.
Deep in the guts of Michael Gordon's New York Times piece about Iranian assistance to Iraqi Shiite militias -- laundered through Hezbollah -- is this:
In a city consumed by chaos, war, occupation, corruption, intermittent and unreliable electricity, sewage overflows that you sometimes have to wade through, food shortages, public-health crises, you know what you shouldn't build ?
Spencer Ackerman's series on the rise of the counterinsurgents continues today with a fascinating piece on Iraq's powerful political figure, Moqtada Sadr. Sadr rose to power as heir to a Shiite clerical line, but Spencer explains the key to Sadr's success is more than nepotism. Sadr is an insurgent leader who has tactically embraced counterinsurgency methods, building loyalty through military strategy complimented by a blend of "appealing political and economic strategy."
Six years and no filed charges later, Sami Al Hajj, the Al Jazeera cameraman, is released from Guantanamo Bay. The New York Times:
Moqtada Sadr remains the most powerful political figure in Iraq. How has he consistently maintained strength?
The House Oversight Committee wonders why the Pentagon continues to fund programs based on non-existent technology.