Sources Holler Back: Torture Edition
Something I always thought journalists should do was to let readers see criticisms of their work made by their sources. After all, unless I show you my notebook -- which would reveal the identities of people who require anonymity -- how do you know if I'm quoting someone accurately or in context? Also, sometimes there's too much stuff contained in an interview and too little space to provide it. Well, blogging kind of solves those problems. So, from time to time I'll share with you the responses I get to my work from my sources, pending their approval, in the interest of providing a more in-depth airing of the issues I'm reporting on.
So for starters, here's the ex-senior CIA official from my interrogation piece, the one who helped devise the agency's interrogation program. The source emails:
My only thoughts are: (1) I don't think you mentioned the "time is of the essence" problems with the relationship-building approach; (2) it's hard to build a relationship when you do not speak or understand the language; and (3) it is particularly hard to build a relationship when the cultural gulf is so vast. This is not meant to say that torture works, but that other methods may fare no better. Finally, I again raise the question of what is torture.
Leaving aside the question of what is torture -- the law, the Geneva Conventions and a whole lot of history make it pretty clear, if not perfectly precise -- these are fair points. While the so-called "ticking bomb" case exists largely as a hypothetical, often interrogators are faced with immediacy concerns. What if a detainee's information is perishable? It is, however, fair to say that the police and the FBI face this situation -- though perhaps not on the scale of a potential terrorist attack -- and they manage to operate without brutality (at least in most cases). Also, the point about language and cultural gaps is well-taken, but the answer there is pretty straightforward: put more effort into recruiting interrogators like George Piro. Obviously that's easier said than done, and I'm not trying to take a cheap shot at CIA. But the objection here just demonstrates how far the agency still has to go to improve its interrogation work.
Comments:
Posted 01/29/2008 04:16pm with
As to “inducements,” one NY Times story when Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) was transferred to Gitmo reported that KSM had not revealed sensitive information until the CIA interrogator persuaded KSM that the CIA knew where KSM’s family was and had the power to harm his family. Some MSM and the wingnuts consistently report that KSM first revealed sensitive information after he was
subjected to [tortured by] waterboarding (so it must be OK to waterboard, right)? I am appalled by both versions. Do you or any of your readers have reliable information as to what “techniques” actually overcame KSM’s resistance?
George Piro’s reported success debriefing Saddam is probably an example that not much in the way of external inducements (anything beyond the conditions of confinement, visitors, etc.) is necessary once rapport is established with a prisoner.
Much of the “field” experience that the CIA had in interrogations between the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and the beginning of the Bush administration in 2001 was with prospective defectors. (As to “defectors,” perhaps the CIA should have insisted that the Germans who debriefed “Curveball” – one of the primary sources of fabricated Feith-based intelligence on Iraq – must let the CIA put Curveball through a waterboarding session before the CIA would allow Cheney, Bush and Powell to cite Curveball’s reported information.) There are lots of legitimate inducements that an interrogator can offer a potential defector. The FBI engaged in this process with al-Quaeda members who became part of the proceedings to prosecute the 1993 World Trade Center bombers.
As to the numbers of interrogators needed who have relevant language and cultural training, shouldn’t we always distinguish between different kinds of subjects of interrogation? If we do that, the numbers of interrogators needed look manageable to me.
KSM was a dedicated high-level enemy operations agent. The first sources of intelligence on al-Quaeda were former members – including operations agents – who were in trouble with the organization and were seeking a safe haven (defectors). Some other captives who were admittedly affiliated with al-Quaeda were mentally or emotionally unstable and had little or no knowledge of sensitive information. Other victims who aroused the suspicion of intelligence officials were kidnapped and taken to “black sites” to be traumatized, then exonerated and released only after a colossal waste of time.
All of these subjects, who had (or were thought to have) active involvement in or factual knowledge about al-Quaeda probably required a language-and-culturally-trained interrogator for effective questioning to obtain intelligence.
At Gitmo, hundreds of young men swept up by Afghan warlords in the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban had no connections with al-Quaeda and either none with the Taliban or were only fighting with the Taliban against foreign military forces invading Afghanistan. The Gitmo prisoners should have been screened more carefully (some screening was apparently done with some groups) before being sent over and probably should have been interviewed by a language-and-culturally-trained interrogator before they were shipped to Gitmo. Certainly once they were there they should have been questioned by someone who knew the prisoner’s language and cultural background, not through an interpreter.
At Abu Ghraib, on the other hand, thousands of young men seized by the Army in indiscriminate sweeps for the purpose of intimidating the Sunni community were dumped into the prison. These numbers substantially compromised the effectiveness of the interrogators at Abu Ghraib. The CIA and other intelligence interrogators were trying to sort out which prisoners probably had reliable information about members or activities of the insurgency and then interrogate those prisoners to learn exactly what they knew about the “who, what, where, when, how” of the insurgency. Having to work through thousands of young men who knew nothing of value must have been overwhelming.
The general impression given in the media is that the CIA does not capture members of al-Quaeda – that activity is done by local intelligence officials in the area where the capture takes place. Many interrogations of al-Quaeda members and associates may be done by local intelligence officials, who know the relevant language and customs. As to the limited number of jihadists turned over to the CIA for extended interrogation, the required number of properly trained interrogators may not be as large as 20 to 25. Of course, when you’re starting from scratch, that could be a large number.
Posted 01/29/2008 04:19pm with
A response to your ex-CIA official from someone who has conducted a lot of interrogations in the Iraq
:
1) Time is always of the essence in the intel world. When your choices are either getting good information relatively late or getting unusable information now, you shouldn’t have to ponder which one to choose. HUMINT is not SIGINT—it takes time.
2) Relationship building is difficult but far from impossible through an interpreter. I’ve done it many times. It’s a major part of the job.
3) The cultural gaps are there but Arabs aren’t nearly as weird as “The Arab Mind” makes them out to be. It’s not hard to empathize/sympathize with an Arab, or get him to empathize/sympathize with you. They’re people. This is textbook Orientalism.
And we know what torture is. We also know what the law is regarding torture. Ignorance thereof is no excuse.
Posted 01/29/2008 04:24pm with
Also: what Ray said.
Posted 01/30/2008 10:19pm with
What are you doing with this? Trying for an Yglesias Lifetime Achievement Award? Doing this, you’re NEVER going to be invited to any soirees with Andrea Mitchell and her hubby, and any other denizens of Fairfax. In fact, you may get a revocation, for life, from Sigma Delta Chi. I ask you, would Tim Rusert EVER do this?